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ABSTRACT 
In  the overlapping generations  model with uncertain lifetimes, 
efficient life insurance  markets and  no operative intergenerational gift 
and bequest motive, a positive birth rate has been shown to be 
sufficient and  necessary for  absence of debt neutrality:  equilibrium 
prices and quantities are  independent  of the mix of government borrowing 
and lump—sum taxation,  holding constant the path of exhaustive public 
spending. 
Implicit in this analysis has been the assumption that the lump—sum 
tax  is a tax  on the income  from human  capital.  Postponing lump—sum 
taxes then makes it possible to shift (part  of)  the  tax burden to future 
generations if the birth rate is positive.  If instead the tax  falls on 
the income  from a non—human fixed factor (land) whose ownership claims 
are priced efficiently, then,  if all  land is owned by generations 
currently alive, changes in the intertemporal  pattern of taxation do not 
permit current generations to shift the  tax burden to future 
generations.  Taxes on the income  from all  "fully  owned  non—human 
-  factors  have this property, even those factors supplied elastically, but 
the latter  will of course be subject to the familiar incentive  or 
allocative effects ofchanges in (non—lump—sue)  taxation. 
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Introduction 
In  the  overlapping  generations  model  without  operative 
intergenerational,  gift and bequest  motives  due  to Blanchard [1985]  (based 
on Yaari [1965]),  a positive birth rate has  been shown to be sufficient 
(Well  [1985])  and  necessary  (Buiter  [1988a,b])  for  absence  of  debt 
neutrality.  Debt  neutrality  prevails  when  equilibrium  prices  and 
quantities  are independent  of the mix of government  borrowing and lump—sum 
taxation,  holding constant  current  and future  exhaustive  public spending. 
Professor V.  Vickrey recently 1 pointed out  to  me  that  even with  a 
positive birth rate,  debt neutrality would still  prevail  if  the  tax  in 
question  were a tax on land.  This note simply  demonstrates  that Professor 
Vickrey is correct.  Models in the Blanchard  tradition  assume (implicitly) 
that  the  lump  sum  tax  is  a  tax  on  the  income  from  human  capital. 
Postponing  the  tax  means  that  some  of  it  will  be  paid  by  the  "new 
entrants",  i.e.  by  new  generations  not  yet  alive  when  the  tax  was 
postponed.  (This holds true even if each agent lives  forever;  finite  or 
uncertain lifetimes  are  irrelevant;  only the  positive birth rate  matters 
(see Buiter [1988a,b])).  Postponing  taxes  will make those  currently  alive 
better off and cet.par.  this will boost  current  consumption. 
If instead  the tax  is paid on the income  from (or on the capital  value 
of) a fixed  factor  of production ("land" in what follows),  if all land that 
is or ever will be is owned  by those  currently  alive  and if the land  market 
is  efficient,  then postponing land taxes  will  (assuming  the  government 
1  At  the  Conference  in Honor of James Tobin,  May 6 and 7,  1988  at Yale 
University. —2— 
satisfies its  solvency constraint)  leave  the  value  of land and aggregate 
consumption  unchanged. 
With a tax on human capital  income,  debt neutrality  would prevail only 
if those  currently  alive  possessed  ownership  claims on the after—tax  wage 
income  of  all  future  generations,  i.e.  if  future  generations were, 
effectively, the  slaves of  the  generations  currently alive.  Operative 
intergenerational  gift and bequest  motives effectively  (at the margin)  give 
those alive  today  command over the  human capital  of future generations, 
and debt neutrality  results. 
The Model 
All the  ingredients  of the model are familiar,  so little  time  will be 
spent in motivating  it (see e.g.  Buiter [1988a, b]). 
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All  stocks and  flows  are  (real)  per  capita quantities.  c  is  private 
consumption, v  the  real  wage,  r  the  lump—sum tax  on wage  income,  g 
exhaustive  public spending,  U  the  tax rate on land rental income,  w total 
private wealth,  the  sum of  non—human wealth  (a)  and human wealth  (h). 
Human capital is the present discounted  value of  future  after—tax labour 
income.  The stock of government  interest—bearing  debt is denoted b,  the 
fixed stock  of ownership  claims  to current  and future land  rentals is Z>0. 
Land ownership  claims per capita  are denoted  z.  The physical  stock of land 
at time t  is  L(t)  and  land per worker is  Q(t).  Note that a  "share'  of 
land,  with price q,  is an entitlement  to l/ZtI  of the future  income  stream 
from all physical land.  The physical stock of land may vary over time. 
3 is the constant  instantaneous  birth  rate and X the constant  instantaneous 
probability  of death;  n3—X is the  instantaneous  growth  rate of population 
and labour  force.  The size  of population  at time zero is scaled  to unity. 
Each household maximizes a time additive  objective functional  over an 
infinite  horizon.  The instantaneous  pure rate of time preference  is  5  and —4— 
the risk—of—death  adjusted subjective  discount  rate is 5+X.  Each surviving 
agent,  regardless  of age,  has the  same  expected streams  of future labour 
income and  of future taxes  on  labour  income  and therefore  possesses  the 
same stock  of human capital. 
Instantaneous  utility is given by the  constant  elasticity of marginal 
utility  function  (l/7)rY  where  E  denotes  individual  consumption.2 
Competitive  life  insurance  or annuities  markets  exist  (with free entry  and 
exit). 
The economy  produces a single  non—storable  commodity  which can be used 
either  for private or for public consumption.  There  is a constant returns 
to  land and  labour production funtion,  strictly concave  with  positive 
marginal products and satisfying  the  Inada  conditions.  Output per capita 
is denoted  f(Q).  The  labour  market is competitive  (equation  (10)). 
Financial  wealth consists of claims  on land (with  unit price q)  and 
government debt.  These two  claims are  perfect  substitutes  in private 
portfolios as shown  in equation (8)  .  The  risklesa  irstantaneoua  real 
interest rate is  r.  The  government spends  on  goods  and services,  pays 
interest on  its  debt,  raises revenue  through lump  sum  taxes  on  labour 
income  and a land tax and borrows to cover  any shortfall  of current  revenue 
from  current  outlays.  Imposing  the terminal  condition: 
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the  government budget  identity  (11)  implies  the  government  solvency 
constraint (12) 
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Substitute  for w in eq  tion (1) using (3) and use  the R.H.S. of equation 
(5) to  substitute  for h(t),  Substitute  qz+b for a and note that,  solving 
(8) forward  for q  (imposing  the terminal  condition 
-r(u)du  lim e  q(s)=O)  we  get:  s- 
- 
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Substituting  for  Q using (9a)  and  for  b using the  government's solvency 
constraint  (12) and rearranging  we get (14) 
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From  the last  term inside  the brackets  on the R.H.S.  of equation (14) it is 
apparent  that,  unless  $—O,  there  will  not  be  debt  neutrality  for 
intertemporal  redistributions  of lump—sun taxes  on human cspital  r.  Note, 
however,  that the tax on  land,  which is of course also  a lump—sum tax, 
"disappears'  when the  valuation  equation for  land (equation  (13))  and the 
government solvency constraint (12)  are  substituted into  the  consumption 
function.  Holding constant  the paths  of exhaustive  public  spending and of 
lump—sum  taxes  on human  capital  income, changes in the path of the land tax 
rate and associated changes in government deficits or  surpluses  do  not 
alter  private consumption.  (In  the  model  under  consideration where 
c(t)=f(Q(t))—g(t)  and Q(t)  and g(t) are exogenous,  debt neutrality  shows  up 
in equilibrium through the  absence of  changes  in  the  path of  interest 
rates).  Since  land is supplied  inelastically  (L(t)  is exogenous),  the tax 
on  land  rental  income will  not  alter  equilibrium allocations through 
familiar  incentive  or allocative  effects. 
The  price  of  land,  q(t),  is  independent  of  intertemporal 
redistributions of  land  taxes  that  satisfy  the  government's solvency 
constraint.  It is of course  not only for inelastically  supplied factors 
such as land that the equality in equation (15)  (whose  L.H.S.  comes from 
the.  land valuation equation and whose R.H.S.  comes from the  government 
solvency  constraint)  holds.  It  holds  for  all  non—human  factors  of 
production,  fixed or  variable,  already in existence  or still to emerge (or 
to be produced), for  which ownership  claims exist today (and are  priced 
efficiently). 
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Other "fully  owned" non—human assets  that  are supplied elastically  (in 
the  short  run and/or  the long run) will share  with land the property that 
current  owners  cannot,  by postponing  taxes, shift (part  of)  the  tax burden 
to future owners  of new assets  that  will  become available  in the future  but 
are  not currently owned by  anyone.  In  the  case of elastically supplied 
factors,  a  proportional tax  such  as  the  land  tax  considered here  is 
distortionary  and will have the usual  allocative  and welfare  effects.  Debt 
neutrality therefore  prevails only (assuming  a positive birth rate and no 
operative  intergenerational gift  and  bequest  motive)  for  changes  in 
non—distortionary  taxes  on the income from  non—human  factors  of  production. 
Note again that debt neutrality  will hold if the fixed factor  grows  or 
shrinks  in an exogenously given manner (e.g.  through exogenous  quality 
improvement  or  deterioration  or  even  through  (exogenous)  land 
reclaiuation3) 
.  What  matters  for  debt  neutrality  to  prevail  is that  agents 
alive  today  possess  ownership  claims to the current and future after—tax 
income from all  land,  both  that physically present today and any  land 
"emerging"  in the  future.  In this  way,  the  ownership claims to the  land 
will,  if the  market for  these  claims is  efficient,  fully reflect  all 
current and future  land taxes. 
3  A matter  of some interest  for the Netherlands! —8— 
Conclusion 
Henry George had a solution to the U.S. budget deficit  problem:  scrap 
all existing  taxes  and replace them  by taxes  on fixed factors.  His  "single 
tax" on (unimproved)  land  values is one example.  Any tax on the productive 
contribution  of "nature"  would do equally  well.  A suitable compensation 
scheme  could take  care of one unpleasant  distributional  implication  of this 
proposal:  large—scale redundancy  among  specialists  on deficit financing. 
Since  the  imposition  of such a tax would (in spite of this  note)  rome  as a 
complete surprise to  everyone,  the  associated compensation scheme would 
also  be  lump—sum and  would  not  distort  the  process of  investment in 
(redundant)  knowledge. —9-- 
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